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Non-deterministic video frame sampling to thwart frame insertion attacks 
ABSTRACT 
Accurate machine understanding of videos is important, e.g., to maintain the integrity 
and policy compliance of videos at a video hosting website. For example, a video-hosting 
website with a policy of hosting only family-friendly videos deploys video understanding 
systems to automatically exclude non-compliant videos. Techniques of image analysis are 
applied to individual video frames to understand the video. Due to the computational cost of 
processing individual frames, videos are sampled, e.g., at a rate of one frame per second, and 
only the sampled frames are subjected to image analysis. 
Sampling-based video understanding is susceptible to attack. For example, such systems 
fail to detect a non-compliant video, if the video includes policy-compliant frames inserted to 
match sampling instants. This disclosure utilizes randomization of sampling instants to thwart 
frame insertion attacks that attempt to mask actual video content. Randomized sampling for 
video understanding also assures reproducibility such that the understanding of the video is 
independent of the sampling instants.  
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Machine perception technologies, e.g., deep neural nets, are used to automatically 
understand unstructured data such as images. Extending machine perception to video, frames of 
a video are analyzed to understand the entire video. However, neural-net inference is 
computationally expensive. Hence video is sub-sampled, e.g., at one frame per second, and 
inference is run only on the sampled frames to understand the video. 
Attacks have been developed that can fool sampling-based video-understanding 
systems, e.g., where the inference from the sampled frames does not match the actual content of 
the video. An example attack is to determine sampling instants, e.g., by trial-and-error, and to 
replace sampled video frames with other images. Such an attack could deceive spam and abuse 
systems that leverage video content signals. For example, if the inserted images that are 
sampled comply with spam/ abuse standards, a neural-net can conclude that the video meets the 
standards, even when the video retains spam/ abusive content. In another example, such an 
attack can promote videos unfairly, e.g., by injecting popular entities into irrelevant videos and 
click-baiting users, or by fooling discovery systems into promoting irrelevant videos.  
Robustness to sampling attacks is important for automatic video understanding 
technologies. Further, another desirable property for such technologies is reproducibility, e.g., 
the understanding of video content should be independent of sampling instants. 
DESCRIPTION 
Techniques of this disclosure thwart the sampling attack by randomizing the sampling 
instant. A video sampled at some nominal sampling rate, e.g., one frame per second, is not 
sampled exactly at each integral second. Rather, the video is sampled at a pseudo-random time 
instant within an interval around the nominal sampling instants. For example, the sampling 
instant may be within ±25% of the period around the nominal sampling instants.  
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Fig. 1: Randomized sampling instants to thwart sampling attack 
Fig. 1 illustrates the randomization of sampling instants per techniques of this 
disclosure. Time-points marked at integral multiples of dt, e.g., 0, dt, 2dt, ..., represent the 
nominal sampling instants. For example, dt=1 represents a nominal sampling rate of one frame 
per second. The grey regions (102) around each nominal sampling instant represent the times 
within which actual sampling of frames takes place. The width of the grey region is represented 
as 2∆. For example, if ∆=0.25 seconds, actual sampling is performed within ±0.25 seconds of 
the nominal sampling instant. The initial sampling instant, shown as zero time in Fig. 1, is itself 
pseudo-randomly selected as an instant between the start of the video and dt seconds into the 
video. The time-line of Fig. 1 is drawn with reference to the pseudo-randomly selected initial 
sampling instant. 
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Fig. 2: Pseudocode for randomized frame sampling 
Fig. 2 illustrates pseudocode for randomized frame sampling of a video, per techniques 
of this disclosure. V is a video file containing video frames v0, v1, ..., vn-1 with presentation 
timestamps t0, t1, ..., tn-1, respectively.  A sub-sampling of V is sought at a positive frame rate T, 
and a new video W is obtained using the sub-sampled frames.  
First, the frame rate T is set (202). The interval between samples is established as the 
reciprocal of the frame rate (204). A randomizer is seeded with a seed that is unique for the 
video. The seed is derived from video content or metadata, e.g., an identifier for the video 
(206). The selection of the seed is such that a malicious user would find it computationally 
prohibitive to establish a map between sampled frames and the video or metadata. The selection 
of the seed is derived such that it is difficult for an uploader of a video to specify it or otherwise 
manipulate its setting. The seed can be based on one or more of the following: video content 
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bytes, metadata such as a video identifier assigned by a video hosting service, one or more user 
identifiers, video header block, video length, resolution, etc. The seed is uniquely associated 
with the video after sanitization, e.g., after stripping metadata that can be manipulated by a user. 
The distribution generated by the randomizer is uniform between 0 and 1.  
An initial sampling instant, desired_t, is pseudo-randomly and uniformly selected 
between 0 and dt (208). An initial video frame v is selected from those video frames vx (0≤ x≤ 
n-1) whose timestamp is closest to desired_t (210). The initial video frame v is appended to a 
set sampled_video_frames (212). A loop runs through the sequence of video frames selecting 
sampling instants desired_t and video frames v that are within a ∆ of successive nominal 
sampling instants (214).
In Fig. 2, ∆ is, for example, 25% of dt, such that the next sampling instant is a uniform 
random instant between 3dt/4 and 5dt/4. The loop exits (illustrated with a break statement) if 
the number of frames in the video is exhausted, e.g., if desired_t equals or exceeds the length of 
the video. A new video W comprising the sampled video frames is obtained (216). 
The performance of the pseudo-random sampling based video-understanding system, as 
described herein, is not different from a video-understanding system that uses fixed sampling 
instants. This is demonstrated by comparing the precision-versus-recall curves of video-
understanding systems based on fixed sampling and pseudo-random sampling instants. 
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Fig. 3: Precision versus recall for video-understanding systems based on fixed sampling versus 
pseudo-random sampling 
Fig. 3 shows the precision-versus-recall performance of a video-understanding system 
based on pseudo-random sampling (blue) and fixed sampling (red). It is evident that there is no 
performance difference attributable to pseudo-random sampling of video frames. 
As an alternate to the system described herein, frame sampling can also be randomized 
by pseudo-randomly selecting a sampling instant and keeping it fixed for blocks of several 
frame-lengths, then pseudo-randomly changing it for a next block of several frame-lengths, and 
so on. Further, sampling rates can be changed between blocks.  
CONCLUSION 
Techniques of this disclosure counter frame-sampling prediction by adversaries by 
deploying a robust sampling scheme for video understanding. The described sampling scheme 
pseudo-randomly samples a video while maintaining adequate time-intervals between sampled 
frames. Adversaries that attempt to mislead video understanding systems, e.g., to bypass policy 
guidelines of a hosting website, by deliberate insertion of frames are thwarted.  
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